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The Potholes of Offender-Funded Driving
Diversion: How Minnesota’s Driving
Diversion Program Fails the People It Is
Supposed to Help
Sammi Nachtigal†
The burden of paying for the United States’ justice system has
shifted from the collective responsibility of taxpayers to the people
facing prosecution.1 States and municipalities hope to close revenue
shortfalls resulting from tax cuts by increasing fines and fees for
low-level offenses.2 Some states have enlisted for-profit companies
to collect unpaid court fines and fees through pay-only probation,
essentially creating criminal justice debt collectors.3 Minnesota has
implemented a new model for criminal justice debt collection: payonly diversion. Minnesota legislators see pay-only diversion run by
for-profit companies as a system where everyone wins: the program
enrollee pays off criminal justice debts through an payment plan,
prosecutors reduce caseloads by funneling misdemeanor offenders
into a diversion program, the for-profit business makes money, and
the state saves money and collects outstanding fines and fees. 4 But
†. J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School, 2019; B.A., University
of Minnesota, 2015. Sammi would like to thank Professor June Carbone and the staff
and editors of Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice for their
assistance in preparing this Article for publication. Sammi would also like to thank
her parents, Sam and Patti, and her sister, Emily, for their unique insights and
support, and her partner, Keagan, for his willingness to lovingly listen as Sammi
verbalized all thoughts and ideas throughout the writing process.
1. PETER EDELMAN, NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
POVERTY IN AMERICA, at xv (2017) (originating in tax cuts in the Reagan era and the
continued political expediency of reducing taxes, revenue gaps in state governments
lead to criminal justice budget cuts and the shift of the cost to “the ‘users’ of the
courts, including those least equipped to pay” through increased fees and fines).
2. Id. at xvi.
3. Neil L. Sobol, Fighting Fines & Fees: Borrowing from Consumer Law to
Combat Criminal Justice Debt Abuses, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 858 (2017); CHRIS
ALBIN-LACKEY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA’S
“OFFENDER-FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 1 (Arvind Ganesan et al. eds., 2014), ht
tps://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0214_ForUpload_0.pdf.
4. See Driver’s License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program Created for
Individuals Charged with Driving Without a Valid License: Hearing on H.F. 589
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in reality, pay-only diversion greatly burdens program enrollees
who are hit with hefty program fees, remain trapped in the criminal
justice system, and rarely see any of the promised program benefits,
such as license reinstatement.5 Furthermore, abusive collection
tactics are rampant: private companies operate diversion programs
with little to no state oversight. As a result, these programs
prioritize profits above all else.6
In Minnesota, the Driving Diversion Program (“DDP”) is
designed to help people who have racked up exorbitant fines and
fees for driving with revoked or suspended licenses.7 DDP, run by
the for-profit probation company Diversion Solutions, LLC, is
completely offender-funded, costing the state and participating
counties and cities nothing. 8 Minnesota legislators are now looking
to expand DDP statewide.9 However, the pilot program’s success
has been overstated.10 While the intentions behind DDP are good,
the program falls short due to a lack of accountability and a
mismatch between private incentives and public goals.
Part I of this Note provides background on national trends in
criminal justice, including the decriminalization of misdemeanors,
increases in fines and fees in an offender-funded criminal justice
system, privatized pay-only probation and diversion, and driver’s
license suspension and revocation for non-driving-related behaviors

Before the H. Public Safety Policy & Oversight Comm., 2009 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn.
2009) [hereinafter Oversight Committee Hearing] (statement of John Choi, Ramsey
Cty. Att’y); Oversight Committee Hearing (statement of Kori Land, City Att’y for
South St. Paul, West St. Paul, & Inver Grove Heights).
5. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 11; Randy Furst, Data Shows Driver’s License
Reinstatement Program Is Less Successful Than Company Claims, STAR TRIB. (May
21, 2017), http://www.startribune.com/data-shows-driver-s-license-reinstatement-pr
ogram-is-less-successful-than-company-claims/423247683/.
6. Carl Takei, From Mass Incarceration to Mass Control, and Back Again: How
Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform May Lead to a For-Profit Nightmare, 20 U. PA.
J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 125, 154 (2017).
7. SAINT PAUL CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, DULUTH CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, &
MINNEAPOLIS CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 2017 LEGISLATIVE REPORT FOR LICENSE
REINSTATEMENT DIVERSION PILOT PROGRAM PURSUANT TO LAWS OF MINNESOTA
2009, CH. 59, ART. 3, § 4, at 4 (2017), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2017/mandat
ed/170267.pdf [hereinafter 2017 Legislative Report].
8. Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of John Choi, Ramsey
Cty. Att’y).
9. Bill Salisbury, Unpaid Traffic Tickets—Debt Trap for the Poor—in MN
Legislators’ Sights, PIONEER PRESS (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.twincities.com/2017
/03/31/mn-legislature-unpaid-traffic-tickets-debt-trap/.
10. Furst, supra note 5.
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and offenses. Part II analyzes DDP’s originating legislation,
program creation, and its operation. Part III examines DDP’s
problems and abuses and argues that these abuses stem from the
mismatch between private incentives and public goals and a lack of
accountability and
oversight.
Part
III also
provides
recommendations to the Minnesota Legislature and suggests better
methods to reduce citations for driving without a valid license and
accountability provisions that should be enacted if DDP becomes
permanent and statewide as intended.
I.

Background on National Trends

Minnesota’s Driving Diversion Program was born from a series
of trends in state criminal justice systems: the decriminalization of
misdemeanors, the shift to an offender-funded system, the use of
pay-only probation outsourced to for-profit companies, and the use
of driver’s license suspension as a civil penalty.11 These trends have
had unintended consequences that harm the United States’ poorest
populations.
A. Decriminalizing Misdemeanors
Constituting 80% of state court dockets, misdemeanor offenses
have grown at significant rates.12 One reason for the growth is the
net-widening
effect
that
results
from
decriminalizing
misdemeanors.13 In dealing with low-level offenders, courts have
moved away from imprisonment toward greater reliance on fines
and probation.14 States see decriminalization as an opportunity for
“immense savings in the costs of prosecution, incarceration, and

11. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 4–5; EDELMAN, supra note 1; Sobol,
supra note 3.
12. America's Massive Misdemeanor System Deepens Inequality, EQUAL JUST.
INITIATIVE (Jan. 9, 2019), https://eji.org/news/americas-massive-misdemeanor-syste
m-deepens-inequality.
13. Sobol, supra note 3, at 859–60. See also Issa Kohler-Hausmann,
Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 630 (2014)
(studying increases in misdemeanor arrests in New York City and finding that the
number of misdemeanor arrests almost doubled between 1993 and 2010); Jenny
Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 281 (2011) (citing a study that found the
volume of misdemeanor cases nationwide rose from five to more than ten million
between 1972 and 2006).
14. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV.
1055, 1059 (2015); Sobol, supra note 3, at 860.

446

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 37: 2

defense counsel.”15 Decriminalization of misdemeanors provides
courts with flexibility to require probation and/or payment of a fine
when sentencing low-level offenders in cases where jail time seems
like
an
excessive
response.16
However,
misdemeanor
17
decriminalization has created “a more streamlined process and
provid[es] fewer procedural protections than jailable offenses,”
including the right to counsel.18 As a result, “decriminalization has
led to a net-widening effect as municipalities have expanded
coverage and imposed” fines and fees on more people.19
Decriminalizing misdemeanors into fine-only offenses may help
individuals who can afford the fines or fees escape the criminal
justice system and avoid incarceration.20 Some offenders may
benefit if they are able to attend incarceration-alternative
treatment programs.21 This approach, however, leaves indigent
defendants ensnared in the system in an unending debt trap.22
B. The Shift to an Offender-Funded Criminal Justice
System Through Ballooning Fines and Fees
Decades of tax cuts have left local governments scrambling to
cut spending and find alternative forms of revenue. 23 Many states
and municipalities have turned to fines and fees in order to fund

15. Natapoff, supra note 14, at 1072.
16. ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 12.
17. Natapoff, supra note 14, at 1057 (“[I]n the misdemeanor context
‘decriminalization’ does not mean ‘legalization’ . . . it typically reduces penalties,
mainly incarceration, for conduct that remains illegal and forbidden.”).
18. Sobol, supra note 3, at 858.
19. Sobol, supra note 3, at 858; Natapoff, supra note 14, at 1055 (adding that the
shift to probation and fines for misdemeanor offenses has had distributive
implications: poor and disadvantaged defendants, for whom fines and supervision
are especially burdensome, get caught in a cycle of never-ending criminal justice
debt, supervision, and possibly jail while well-resourced offenders are permitted to
exit the process with relative ease).
20. Sobol, supra note 3, at 877.
21. Sobol, supra note 3, at 877.
22. Sobol, supra note 3, at 877.
23. Edelman, supra note 1, at xv; Sobol, supra note 3, at 859. See U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT
2–3 (2015), https://perma.cc/2BK4-5AC2 (reporting findings from the investigation
of the Ferguson Police Department following the fatal shooting Michael Brown (an
unarmed black teenager) that showed there was a focus on generating revenue in
police practices and that “the court primarily use[s] its judicial authority as the
means to compel the payment of fines and fees that advance the City’s financial
interests.”).
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their criminal justice systems.24 Some cities “incentivized by their
own budget goals and shortfalls, encourage local police to increase
the number of citations in order to drive up revenue,” with
municipal courts acting as the “mechanism for collection.” 25 In the
U.S. over ten million individuals are estimated to have criminal
justice debt, over $50 billion and growing. 26 When defendants
cannot pay their criminal justice debt,27 they may face more fines,
fees, extended probation, civil penalties (such as driver license
suspension), or jail.28
In 1983, the Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional to
jail an indigent person for failure to pay a fine if that person made
“sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so”29 and
that “the court must consider alternative measures of punishment
other than imprisonment.”30 Despite this ruling, people in many
states who cannot pay off their accumulating criminal justice debt
often find themselves jailed for low-level, fine-only offenses for no
reason other than nonpayment of those fines and court costs.31
Fortunately, in Minnesota, arrest warrants are not issued for
failure to pay fines; however, failure to pay can result in license
suspension.32

24. Natapoff, supra note 14, at 14.
25. Whitney Benns & Blake Strode, Debtors’ Prison in 21st-Century America,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/02/de
btors-prison/462378/.
26. Sobol, supra note 3, at 855.
27. Criminal justice debt refers to the amassing of fees and fines from all stages
of the criminal process including pre-conviction, sentencing, incarceration, and postrelease supervision. Sobol, supra note 3, at 841–42; Lauren-Brooke Eisen & Jessica
Eaglin, Poverty, Incarceration, and Criminal Justice Debt, TALK POVERTY (Dec. 2,
2014), https://talkpoverty.org/2014/12/02/criminal-justice-debt/.
28. Eisen & Eaglin, supra note 27.
29. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983).
30. Id. at 661 (adding that the state is justified in using imprisonment as a
sanction to enforce collection when a probationer who has the means to pay willfully
refuses to pay a fine or restitution).
31. See Torie Atkinson, Note, A Fine Scheme: How Municipal Fines Become
Crushing Debt in the Shadow of the New Debtors’ Prisons, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
189, 217–25 (2016) (adding that criminal justice debt has some of the same effects as
consumer credit debt, including: “poor credit, feelings of shame and emotional
distress, and an increased risk of losing transportation, housing, work, and good
health” in addition to state actions that may include “license suspension, loss of
community services and government benefits,” and potentially the issuance of arrest
warrants).
32. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 4.
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C. Privatizing Criminal Justice Debt Collection
When the criminal justice system becomes a source of revenue,
extraction of that revenue is an important goal of the criminal
process.33 To eliminate operation costs entirely, municipalities and
states privatize criminal justice debt collection, which allows forprofit companies to collect debt free of cost to the taxpayers by
passing off the hefty price to the offender. 34 Pay-only probation is
used for low-level offenders who face fines and fees totaling an
amount beyond their ability to pay immediately.35 Offenders who
can pay off their fines and fees entirely are able to close the cases
against them and avoid supervision.36 Offenders who cannot pay
their fines and court costs are sentenced to probation where the sole
substantive condition is making regular and timely payments as
part of a long-term payment plan. 37 Probation officers do not
supervise such offenders; instead, they “collect money, and . . . use
the credible threat of incarceration to coerce offenders into paying
down their fines along with their probation fees.” 38 Offender-funded
pay-only probation, often contracted out to for-profit private
probation companies, means that in addition to paying off their
criminal justice debt, probationers are required to “pay for the
‘privilege’ of being put on probation” by way of supervision fees.39
When municipalities outsource pay-only probation to private, forprofit companies, the companies operate with little oversight and
“often employ aggressive intimidation tactics to coerce
repayment.”40
Privatized diversion has emerged as a new revenue-generation
and debt-collection tactic.41 Diversion differs significantly from

33. Natapoff, supra note 14, at 1100.
Natapoff, supra note 14, at 1100.
35. ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 25–26.
36. ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 25.
37. ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 26.
38. ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 26; Neil Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal
Justice Debt and Modern Day Debtor’s Prisons, 75 MD. L. REV. 486, 518–19 (2016)
(“Defendants unable to pay fines upfront are subject to additional fees and remain
in the system, even though they pose no threat to society and their underlying
offenses, such as traffic violations, typically do not require incarceration.”).
39. ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 26.
40. Atkinson, supra note 31, at 206.
41. Shaila Dewan & Andrew W. Lehren, After a Crime, the Price of a Second
Chance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/us/crimecriminal-justice-reform-diversion.html.
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probation. Probation is the “suspension of sentence by the court,”
meaning an offender on probation will remain in the community
through the duration of the sentence, unless that offender engages
in conduct that violates the conditions of probation, in which case
the sentence would be carried out.42 Probation typically is imposed
after a finding of guilt.43 Diversion, though, happens beforehand
and instead of suspending a jail sentence, suspends criminal
prosecution of the offense “subject to the defendant’s consent to
treatment, rehabilitation, restitution, or other noncriminal or
nonpunitive alternatives.”44 Diversion is meant “to relieve
overburdened courts and crowded jails, and to spare low-risk
offenders from the devastating consequences of a criminal record.”45
In many jurisdictions, however, it has become a source of revenue
collection.46 Diversion is typically privatized and offender-funded;
therefore, it may come at a cost that is out of reach for many lowincome offenders.47 As a result, some low-income offenders do not
get the option of diversion or are terminated from diversion for
failure to pay and then subjected to the original charge.48
D. Withdrawing Driving Privileges for Social NonConformance Offenses
Each year across the United States, an increasing number of
drivers are suspended or revoked for non-driving related reasons
following “significant increase[s] in legislated social nonconformance suspensions.”49 Social non-conformance suspensions

42. Lewis Diana, What Is Probation?, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
SCI. 189, 190 (1960).
43. Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, State Court’s Power to Place Defendant on
Probation Without Imposition of Sentence, 56 A.L.R. 3d 932, § 2[a] at 935 (1974).
44. Debra T. Landis, Pretrial Diversion: Statute or Court Rule Authorizing
Suspension or Dismissal of Criminal Prosecution on Defendant’s Consent to
Noncriminal Alternative, 4 A.L.R. 4th 147, 1[a] at 150 (1981) (“Pretrial diversionary
programs are premised on the belief that it is not always necessary, and in fact, may
often be detrimental, to pursue formal courtroom prosecution for every criminal
violation.”).
45. See Dewan & Lehren, supra note 41.
46. See Dewan & Lehren, supra note 41.
47. See Dewan & Lehren, supra note 41. (“Some prosecutors said fees were
necessary to cover programs’ costs. In other cases, defendants were used as piggy
banks.”).
48. See Dewan & Lehren, supra note 41.
49. Suspended/Revoked Working Group, Best Practices Guide to Reducing
Suspended Drivers, AM. ASS’N MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINS., 5 (Feb. 2013), https://www
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“have no relationship to an individual’s ability to drive, their
moving violation history, or any other factors related to the
operation of a motor vehicle.”50 The rationale behind social nonconformance suspensions is that it “provides effective, sustainable
motivation to encourage individuals to comply with court ordered or
legislated mandates to avoid suspension”; however, this lacks
empirical support.51 When people lose driving privileges for nondriving related reasons, evidence suggest that those people take the
suspension less seriously.52 At least 75% of people who have had
their driving privileges withdrawn continue to drive. 53 Penalizing
social non-conformance through license suspension and revocation
creates significant burdens on courts, prosecutors, motor vehicle
agencies, and law enforcement. 54 Additionally, such penalties
“require[] the driver licensing authority to operate outside of their
core mission of ensuring highway safety.” 55
License suspensions disproportionately affect low-income
communities, especially low-income communities of color.56 First,
when failure to pay a traffic fine results in license suspension, “poor
people get their licenses suspended much more often than those
with means, as they don’t have the cash to pay.” 57 These penalties
make “driver’s licensing about whether you can pay a fine based on
middle-class incomes, not because of how well you drive.” 58 The
issue is compounded for low-income people of color who are pulled
over by law enforcement more often than are Whites.59
.aamva.org/workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=3723 [hereinafter AAMVA].
50. Id.
52. Joseph Shapiro, Can’t Pay Your Fines? Your License Could Be Taken, NPR
(Dec. 29, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/12/29/372691960/cant-pay-your-fines-you
r-license-could-be-taken.
53. Id.
54. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 4; AAMVA, supra note 49, at 12.
55. AAMVA, supra note 49, at 22.
56. Joshua Aiken, Reinstating Common Sense: How Driver’s License Suspensions
for Drug Offenses Unrelated to Driving Are Falling out of Favor, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/driving/national.html;
Alana Semuels, No Driver’s License, No Job, ATLANTIC (Jul. 15, 2016), https://www.
theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/no-drivers-license-no-job/486653/.
57. Semules, supra note 56.
58. Semules, supra note 56 (quoting Nichole Yunk-Todd).
59. Elizabeth Davis et al., Contacts Between Police and the Public, 2015, OFFICE
OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS 4 (Oct. 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp15.pdf;
David Montgomery, Data Dive: Racial Disparities in Minnesota Traffic Stops,
PIONEER PRESS (Jul. 8, 2016), https://www.twincities.com/2016/07/08/data-dive-raci
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Those who lose their driving privileges face many adverse
employment effects.60 New Jersey’s Motor Vehicles Affordability
and Fairness Task Force conducted a study on the impact of nondriving related license suspensions.61 The Task Force discovered
that license suspensions negatively affected respondents across all
income levels and age groups: 42% reported job loss after
suspension, 45% reported an inability to find employment after
suspension, and 58% stated that suspension negatively impacted
job performance.62 Low-income drivers fared far worse.63 Among
low-income respondents, the Task Force found that 64% were not
able to keep a job after suspension; 51% reported an inability to find
employment after suspension; and 66% indicated that the
suspension negatively affected job performance.64 Additionally,
among low-income respondents, 65% indicated that they were
unable to pay increased insurance costs; 64% experienced other
costs related to suspension; and 90% of those who experienced other
costs were not able to pay those costs.65 Many unlicensed drivers
continue to drive which can lead to longer suspensions and more
fines and fees. 66 Without a valid license—a requirement for many
jobs—people struggle to find well-paying jobs or maintain
employment without reliable transportation.67 As a result, lowincome, unlicensed drivers often become trapped in this cycle.68
II. Overview of Minnesota’s Driving Diversion Program
After recognizing the cyclical problems low-income, unlicensed
drivers in Minnesota were facing, the State Legislature created a
pilot relicensing program that has become known as the Driving
Diversion Program.
al-disparities-in-minnesota-traffic-stops/.
60. Semules, supra note 56.
61. See ALAN M. VOORHEES ET AL., MOTOR VEHICLES AFFORDABILITY & FAIRNESS
TASK FORCE: FINAL REPORT (2006), https://dspace.njstatelib.org/xmlui/bitstream/h
andle/10929/21212/a9392006a.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
62. Id. at 38.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Kori Land, City
Att’y for South St. Paul, West St. Paul, and Inver Grove Heights); Shapiro, supra
note 52.
67. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 8.
68. Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Kori Land).
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A. Minnesota’s Unlicensed Drivers Problem
In Minnesota, an estimated 700,000 people are driving after
the state has withdrawn their driving privileges. 69 While many
drivers are suspended or revoked for driving-related offenses (such
as driving under the influence, careless or reckless driving, or
repetitive speeding),70 many have lost driving privileges for social
non-conformance offenses including suspensions for failing to pay
child support, failing to appear in court, or failing to pay a traffic
fine or parking ticket.71 Though an initial violation may not carry
potential jail time, if the driver fails to pay the fine, gets suspended
as a result of nonpayment, and continues to drive after the
suspension, they may face up to 90 days in jail, a $1,000 fine, or
both in addition to a reinstatement fee and a longer suspension. 72
Driving after suspension (“DAS”) or driving after revocation
(“DAR”)73 are payable misdemeanor offenses,74 meaning they “can
be disposed of by paying a fine rather than appearing in court.”75
Payment of a fine constitutes a guilty plea.76 Upon pleading guilty
to DAS or DAR—either by paying fines out of court or appearing in
court—defendants face the additional consequence of further
license suspension.77 This creates a “revolving door” for many
offenders.78 After paying the fines and fees of the first offense, the
license is further suspended; therefore, if the re-suspended person
continues to drive they risk more misdemeanor charges and more
fines and fees.79 Many drivers with suspended or revoked licenses
struggle to get reinstated because they have substantial

12.

69. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 4.
70. MINN. STAT. § 171.18.
71. See 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 5; AAMVA, supra note 49, at

72. See 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 4.
73. MINN. STAT. § 171.24 Subd. 1–4.
74. 2017 State Payable List Traffic/Criminal, MINN. JUD. BRANCH (2017) http://
mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/scao_library/Statewide%20Payables/2017-TrafficCriminal-Payables-Lists.pdf.
75. Max A. Keller, “Payable” Offenses, BENCH & B. MINN. (Oct. 15, 2012), http://
mnbenchbar.com/2012/10/payable-offenses/.
76. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 23.03 subd. 3.
77. MINN. R. 7409.2200, subpart 4.
78. Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Kori Land).
79. Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Kori Land) (“[I]f
they simply pay the citation; they get suspended again. And they continue to drive
because they continue to need to get to work, or get to pick up the kids, or get
groceries.”).
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outstanding fines and fees, payment of which is required for
reinstatement.80
B. The Legislature’s Solution: The Driving Diversion
Program
Minnesota created the DDP to help people who have
suspended driving privileges by allowing them to drive while they
pay off their criminal justice debt over a period of time.81 The
legislature recognized that license suspension dramatically affects
low-income drivers who cannot afford to stop driving, particularly
those of color.82 Diversion Solutions reported that Black
participants make up 54% of DDP’s participants compared to 33%
White participants, and 6% Hispanic. 83 According to the U.S.
Census
Bureau,
Minnesota’s
racial
demographics
are
approximately 85% White, 6.2% Black, and 5.2% Hispanic.84
In 2009, the Minnesota Legislature created the license
reinstatement pilot program for a few selected cities.85 Subsequent
legislation extended the program in 2010, 2011, and 2013. 86
Pursuant to the law, participating cities “may establish a license
reinstatement diversion pilot program” in which drivers charged
with DAS or DAR who have not yet pleaded guilty may be issued a
“diversion driver’s license” while participating in the diversion
program and after paying a license reinstatement fee. 87 Program
participants are required to “(1) successfully attend and complete,
at the individual’s expense, educational classes that
provide . . . information on drivers’ licensure; (2) pay . . . all
required fees, fines, and charges . . .; (3) comply with all traffic laws;
and (4) demonstrate compliance with vehicle insurance

80. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 8.
81. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 4–5.
82. See Salisbury, supra note 9.
83. According to Scott Adkisson, Diversion Solutions CEO, these percentages are
from class instructors visually surveying the participants attending the DDP class.
Telephone Interview with Scott Adkisson, CEO, Diversion Solutions, LLC (Jan. 2,
2018).
84. QuickFacts: Minnesota, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quick
facts/MN (last visited Feb. 14, 2019).
85. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59
art. 3 § 4.
86. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 4.
87. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59
art. 3 § 4.
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requirements.”88 The statute also states that a participant’s
enrollment in the diversion program may terminate if the program’s
“third-party administrator” finds that the individual is “no longer
satisfying the conditions of the diversion. . .[or]. . .is guilty of a
moving traffic violation or failure to provide vehicle insurance.” 89
The statute requires a biennial report from “the commissioner
of public safety and each eligible city that participates in the
diversion program . . . concerning the results of the program.” 90 The
report must contain the following information: (1) recidivism rates;
(2) the number of unlicensed drivers continuing to drive; (3) the
amounts cities, counties, and the state have collected through the
payment of fees and fines; (4) educational support the program
provides participants; (5) the program’s total number of
participants and the number of participants that have been
terminated; and (6) recommendations for necessary legislative
changes.91
Diversion Solutions, LLC (“Diversion Solutions”) developed
and administers DDP and has been the only company to contract
with participating cities and counties during the pilot program.92
The legislation allows participating cities or counties to contract
with other third-party administrators, but Diversion Solutions is
the primary vendor in the market.93 A driver with a DAS or DAR
citation may hear about the program from the officer who gave them
the citation, from the prosecutor at their first court appearance, or
from a non-profit support group.94 When a driver contacts Diversion
Solutions to request admission into the program, Diversion
Solutions consults with Minnesota’s Department of Public Safety,
the Department of Vehicle Services, and the prosecutor to
determine whether the driver is eligible to participate. 95
Participants must attend a class on driving laws and the program’s
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6, 19.
93. Furst, supra note 5.
94. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6.
95. Drivers are ineligible to participate in DDP for numerous reasons including
if they have outstanding warrants, owe child support, have a “revoked” license status
due to a DWI offense, have an invalid license in another state, and if they do not
have an open citation in a participating city or county. 2017 Legislative Report, supra
note 7, at 6, 9.
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requirements.96 Participants must also provide proof of valid
insurance, pay a license reinstatement fee, and take a written and
driving test to receive a valid driver’s license.97 From that point on,
as long as the participant remains in good standing with the DDP,
a notation will appear in the participant’s driving record alerting
law enforcement “that the individual is a ‘Participant in Diversion
Pilot Program’ and thus subject to all of the conditions of the DDP
and Minnesota Laws.” 98 Diversion Solutions creates a payment
plan, lasting no longer than eighteen months, for each participant.99
This payment plan includes Diversion Solutions’ $350 service fee. 100
The statute states that “the original charge against the
individual . . . may be reinstated against an individual whose
participation in the diversion program terminates” for failure to
“satisfy[] the conditions of the diversion.”101 One of the conditions of
diversion is to make payments according to the payment plan
designed by Diversion Solutions.102 Therefore, if a DDP participant
is unable to keep up on monthly payments, that participant faces
the re-withdrawal of their license and is subject to the original DAS
or DAR charge with a potential sentence of up to a $1,000 fine and
90 days in jail.
III. Analysis of DDP’s Privatized Pay-Only Diversion Model
and How That Model Leads to Abuses
For-profit, pay-only diversion is a flawed model that puts
profits and cutting costs above quality performance. The public goal
behind DDP—reducing the number of unlicensed drivers on the
road103—does not fit with how the third-party, for-profit company is
incentivized, therefore leading to poor quality of service, unmet
promises, and abusive practices.
Holding offenders accountable is a top priority, but Diversion
Solutions and other for-profit diversion companies should also be
held accountable. The Minnesota legislature could enact several

96. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6, 9.
97. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6, 9.
98. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6, 9.
99. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6.
100. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6.
101. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59
art. 3 § 4.
102. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6.
103. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59
art. 3 § 4.
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accountability measures that may help reduce DDP’s third-party
administrator abuses. Additionally, alternative solutions for
reducing the number of people driving on revoked or suspended
licenses exist and should be explored.
A. DDP Is Privatized, Pay-Only Diversion
DDP is a type of pay-only diversion program. Failure to comply
with the conditions of DDP, including the failure to make payments,
maintain valid car insurance, or attend a class, does not
immediately result in the issuance of an arrest warrant—a possible
result for a probation violation—however, terminated DDP
participants lose their driving privileges again and face the original
DAS or DAR charge. 104 DDP allows counties and municipalities to
push thousands of low-level offenders out of the courtroom and into
the hands of for-profit companies.105
DDP is completely offender-funded and gives private
companies unregulated power to determine how and how much
offenders pay for their service.106 Currently, participants enrolled
in DDP pay Diversion Solutions $350 as part of their payment plan,
though the statute sets no limit on how much third-party
administrators can charge offenders for their services.107 The
statute also grants third-party administrators the power to
determine what fees are to be paid, whether third-party
administrators can charge additional fees for late payments, and
whether third-party administrators can increase fees for
participants with longer payment plans.108 Diversion Solutions
collects this program fee first once participants begin making
payments according to their payment plan.109 According to
Diversion Solutions’ CEO Scott Adkisson, neither DPS, the
prosecutor, nor Diversion Solutions have an evaluation process to
determine whether an offender can afford to pay before a

104. Id.
105. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6.
106. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59
art. 3 § 4; 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 8.
107. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws., ch. 59
art. 3 § 4.
108. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 8.
109. Payment of the reinstatement fee must be made upfront, but it is typically
paid directly to DPS. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn.
Laws, ch. 59 art. 3 § 4; Interview with Scott Adkisson, supra note 83.
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participant is admitted into the program.110 Without a preadmittance financial evaluation, some participants are admitted
even though they are unlikely to complete the program because of
a lack of financial resources or stable income. Once admitted, these
participants face termination for failure to pay after a few months
of making payments.
Compounding the issue, the first monthly payments all go
toward Diversion Solutions’ $350 program fee rather than towards
participants’ criminal justice debt.111 For example, if a person who
owes $1,000 in unpaid fines and fees begins making $100 monthly
payments but fails to continue making scheduled payments after
the first five months, the participant will still owe $850 in criminal
justice debt though they have paid $500 while in DDP. Diversion
Solutions is incentivized to enroll as many participants as possible
even if a participant likely will not be able to complete diversion—
either from failing to make consistent payments or their inability to
get insurance—because Diversion Solutions’ revenue depends on its
ability to collect money from participants. Without increased
accountability, oversight, and a removal of the profit-incentivizing
framework, DDP—whether run by Diversion Solutions or a
different third-party administrator—will have an incentive to put
profits over quality performance, and participants will be the ones
who pay.
B.

DDP’s Problems and Abuses

Diversion Solutions, no stranger to abusive collection
tactics,112 violates DDP’s enabling legislation by accepting
payments prior to a participant’s proof of insurance, keeping
participants enrolled despite disqualifying moving violations,
misrepresenting DDP’s success, and failing to provide an adequate
educational component.113 The aim of the program was to end the
110. Interview with Scott Adkisson, supra note 83.
111. Interview with Scott Adkisson, supra note 83.
112. See Randy Furst, Diversion Firm Owner Chosen by County Attorney
Associated with Past Sanctions, STAR TRIB. (Apr. 21, 2017), http://www.startribune.
com/diversion-firm-owner-chosen-by-county-attorney-associated-with-past-sanction
s/420095933/ (“[C]ompanies Adkisson has been involved in were sanctioned by the state
Department of Commerce and Attorney General for operating without a license and
misrepresenting themselves as law enforcement or a prosecutor while improperly
collecting fees.”).
113. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59
art. 3 § 4.
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“revolving door”114 and shut down a system that criminalized
poverty.115 In reality, the revolving door is stuck shut, trapping poor
offenders in a program that does not deliver on its promises.
i.

Accepting payments from uninsured individuals

One of the most serious abuses Diversion Solutions engages in
is accepting payment from participants prior to receiving proof of
insurance.116 It is a requirement that all participants acquire
insurance to participate in the program.117 Many participants are
low-income,118 and experience difficulty finding auto insurance that
they can afford. 119 Participants in DDP cannot acquire a valid
license status without that insurance, yet Diversion Solutions
reportedly accepts payments from uninsured individuals who
should not be in the program.120 As a private company, Diversion
Solutions is solely motivated by profits—they cannot make money
unless they get people into the program and on a payment plan—
therefore, the company has no incentive to terminate drivers from
the program upon finding that they are not insured. Abuse of the
insurance requirement is foreseeable when DDP’s third-party
administrator operates without oversight.
ii. Not terminating participants who commit subsequent
moving violations
DDP’s enabling legislation states that a participant who “is
guilty of a moving traffic violation” will be terminated from DDP. 121
When asked in a phone interview what happens if someone enrolled
in the program gets a speeding ticket, Scott Adkisson, Diversion
Solution’s CEO, said that he tells participants that if they get a
traffic ticket to go pay it—they will not be terminated from the
114. Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Kori Land).
115. Hearing on H.F. 1670 Before the Pub. Safety and Sec. Policy and Fin. Comm.,
2017 Leg., 90th Sess. (Minn. 2017) (statement of Rep. Zerwas).
116. Furst, supra note 5.
117. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59
art. 3 § 4.
118. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 8.
119. Furst, supra note 5; Jennifer Bjorhus, If You’re Poor, You’ll Pay More for Car
Insurance, Study Finds, STAR TRIB. (June 27, 2016), http://www.startribune.com/re
port-low-income-drivers-pay-59-percent-more-for-car-insurance/384565011/.
120. Furst, supra note 5.
121. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59
art. 3 § 4.
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program.122 This directly contradicts the express language of the
Minnesota law that created the program.123 Without oversight,
Diversion Solutions is incentivized to keep participants in the
program so they can collect the entirety of each individual’s $350
program fee, and additionally inflate their purported success.
iii. Misrepresenting DDP’s success
DDP is required by law to release a biannual report
“concerning the results of the program” including “recidivism rates
for participants . . . and the number of participants who have
terminated from the pilot program.”124 If Diversion Solutions is
violating the statute by keeping participants in the program who
should have been terminated because of subsequent moving
violations, data for recidivism rates and termination rates may not
be accurate.125
Additionally, Diversion Solutions claims DDP has an 82%
success rate, counting participants who are “graduated, active or
waiting.”126 Data from the Department of Public Safety reveals that
“only 223 of the 27,308 drivers who applied to the program
successfully completed it—a rate of less than 1 percent.”127 This
suggests that most drivers “end up in an endless cycle of making
payments to the company without getting their full driving
privileges back.”128
The number of drivers who became valid through DDP has
also been called into question. The company touts on its website
that “[s]ince 2009, the program has had over 12,000 participants

122. Interview with Scott Adkisson, supra note 83.
123. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59
art. 3 § 4; Furst, supra note 5 (“A 2016 DPS review of the program found Diversion
Solutions continued to accept payments from participants even though subsequent
tickets disqualified them from the program.”).
124. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59
art. 3 § 4.
125. Furst, supra note 5 (“Diversion Solutions said just 6 percent of those in the
program reoffend, but ‘DVS records indicate a much higher recidivism rate,’
according to a memo by Liam Powell, who supervises the driver’s license
reinstatement program in DPS’ Driver and Vehicle Services division.”).
126. Furst, supra note 5.
127. Furst, supra note 5; 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 9 (reporting
that from 2009 through 2016 over 23,494 individuals applied for DDP and 13,374
were accepted to participate and l0,120 were rejected).
128. Furst, supra note 5
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legally reinstated.”129 Department of Public Safety data, however,
indicates only 4,589 drivers have become valid through the
program.130 A full audit of the program is required to determine
DDP’s actual success.
iv. Failing to provide an adequate educational component
The 2017 Legislative Report states that DDP participants are
required “to attend a 4 hour educational course” on the program’s
requirements in addition to educational lessons on “[w]hy there are
laws, 36 laws that they must absolutely know and how to become a
responsible neighbor.”131 The actual class is at most an hour and a
half, and most of that time is spent going over the participants’
contracts.132 The only educational aspect of the class consisted of a
brief eight-minute video on basic driver education.133 Diversion
Solutions is not incentivized to make sure drivers are equipped with
the requisite knowledge of highway safety. Classes therefore focus
on what they are incentivized to make sure participants
understand: payment.
C. DDP’s Merits
While in many ways DDP fails to meet the goals of wellintended policy-makers, prosecutors, and criminal justice
advocates, it could be argued that it is worth keeping, despite its
flaws. Drivers in DDP get the opportunity to avoid convictions,
settle criminal justice debts, and drive confidently with valid
licenses. DDP, as a form of pay-only diversion, does not wield the
threat of jail to coerce payment, which has been reported in abusive
pay-only probation programs.134 Not only does DDP cost taxpayers
nothing, but the program helps the state “recover[] significant
outstanding fine and fee revenue that would otherwise remain
uncollected.”135 Additionally, there are unintended benefits of DDP

129. Diversion Solutions, Driver’s License Reinstatement Program: For
Participant, https://diversionsolutions.net/participants/drivers-license-reinstatemen
t-program/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2019).
130. Furst, supra note 5.
131. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 7.
132. Scott Adkisson, CEO, Diversion Solutions, LLC, Address at the Driving
Diversion Program Class (Jan. 4, 2018).
133. Id.
134. ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 25–27.
135. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 11.
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including “[p]aid citations in non-participating jurisdictions;
[v]oluntary clearance of active arrest warrants; [d]isposition of
dormant DAS/DAR citations; Department of Revenue collection
fees; [s]atisfaction of outstanding judgments; and [p]ayment of child
support arrears.”136 DDP has not been without success stories.137
DDP supporters may argue that the private pay-only diversion
model is significantly better than alternative solutions: no program
at all or a state-run program. Without any program in place,
unlicensed drivers will continue to accumulate DAS/DAR charges
and struggle to pay the accruing fines and fees without the ability
to drive. A state-run program may not be as effective at collecting
criminal justice debt as private companies. Additionally, the cost of
a state-run program will likely be harder to justify to taxpayers
than a zero-tax-dollar private program. However, the merits of the
private pay-only diversion model are marred by Diversion
Solutions’ rampant abuses, and its ineffectiveness for many of
Minnesota’s lowest income drivers. With payment as the sole
substantive requirement of diversion and nonpayment resulting in
prosecution, diversion and its promises are a privilege out of reach
for the poor.138
D. Recommendations
One of the Legislature’s intentions in creating DDP was to
collect criminal justice debt through the most cost-effective method:
privatization.139 The recent reports of abuse—most notably that
Diversion Solutions accepts payments before confirming that the
driver is insured—illustrate that privatizing the license
reinstatement program with no regulatory oversight or
accountability leaves participants vulnerable to greedy collection
tactics. Many of the stated goals of DDP are steeped in benevolence,
such as providing a solution for drivers who cannot afford to pay
136. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 10.
137. See Salisbury, supra note 9.
138. See Dewan & Lehren, supra note 41 (reporting on how diversion “can be
revoked for failure to pay, or never even offered to defendants deemed too poor to
afford it” leading to dramatic inequalities).
139. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6, 10. See also Pub. Safety & Sec.
Policy & Fin. Comm., 2017 Leg., 90th Sess. (Minn. 2017) (statement by Rep. Zerwas)
(“You can’t lose out on what we are not collecting and that is what we are facing right
now . . . we’ve brought in $6.6 million since 2010 . . . that is $1.3 million a year in
fines and fees that otherwise would not be collected if there wasn’t a payment plan
allowing these people to get to work.”).
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fines and fees and ensuring public safety.140 However, as long as
third-party administrators are allowed to operate with no oversight
or accountability, the criminal justice debt-collection function of the
program will trump any of the more altruistic intentions of the
program.
In order to balance the interests of providing a cost-effective
solution that does not put profits above quality performance, the
Minnesota Legislature must enact several accountability measures
before expanding DDP statewide. The current statute authorizing
the pilot program not only enables the aforementioned abuses, but
also leaves the door open to further corruption. If Minnesota hopes
to create a functioning DDP, it has two options. It could put
protections in place to keep third-party administrators like
Diversion Solutions accountable. Else, it must fundamentally
change and become a program within the Department of Public
Safety. The very need for the program may be dramatically reduced
and some of its goals achieved by eliminating social nonconformance suspensions and reducing fines and fees.
i.

Necessary accountability and oversight measures for a
statewide DDP

The legislation that authorized the creation of DDP as a pilot
program provides few requirements for third-party administrators.
If the Minnesota Legislature wants to expand the program
statewide,141 the statute must have specific requirements for thirdparty administrators that ensure program fee structures and
payment plans are fair and not overly burdensome for participants.
However, as seen with Diversion Solutions’ failure to meet the
statutorily required educational components without consequences,
compliance with statutory requirements must be ensured with
proper oversight and accountability measures.
140. Pub. Safety & Sec. Policy & Fin. Comm., 2017 Leg., 90th Sess. (Minn. 2017)
(statement by Mary Ellen Heng, Minneapolis Deputy City Att’y, Crim. Div.) (“We
want people to be driving legally with valid insurance in the event that they should
have an accident . . . .We want programs to hold people accountable while also being
fair to their circumstances.”); Salisbury, supra note 9 (“Poor people are
disproportionately affected by driver’s license suspensions, [Rep. Zerwas] said. ‘We’re
criminalizing poverty.’”).
141. Legislation seeking to make DDP a statewide program was introduced in the
2017 session. Though the bill failed to be made into law, it had bipartisan support
and could potentially be reintroduced in upcoming sessions. License Reinstatement
Diversion Program, H.F. 1671, 90th Leg. § 171.2405 (2017).
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Human Rights Watch has made recommendations to states
that contract with for-profit probation companies.142 Many of these
recommendations are appropriate for DDP. If the Minnesota
legislature seeks to make DDP a statewide program and continue
to contract with private diversion companies to run it, the
legislature should enact accountability provisions that include the
creation of an oversight committee sufficiently staffed with
professionals capable of conducting thorough investigations,
unannounced inspections, and compliance reviews. 143 This
oversight committee would be responsible for collecting and
publishing data on how much money third-party administrators
collect in fees from DDP participants; how many participants are
terminated from DDP and for what cause; and, how many
participants and former participants re-offend and/or become resuspended.
Ideally, the legislature would move away from an offenderfunded model and prohibit third-party administrators from
collecting program fees.144 Program fees discriminate against lowincome offenders by making diversion accessible only to those who
can afford to pay for the benefit of avoiding prosecution.
Additionally, program fees incentivize private diversion companies
to enroll ineligible participants.145 However, simply replacing
program fees with a fixed price contract may produce a low-bid race
to the bottom with companies employing reductionist methods to
offer the least expensive program.146 The only way to remove
program fees and ensure quality service to participants would be to
run the program internally in the Department of Public Safety with
professionally trained staff who are not incentivized by profits but
by making Minnesota’s roadways safer.
ii. Remove the causes
Legislators should take aim at the root causes that cause
individuals to fail to pay fines and fees, lose their licenses for failing
142. ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 7.
143. See ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 7.
144. See ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 7.
145. See Furst, supra note 5.
146. E.g. Margaret Lemos, Civil Challenges to the Use of Low-Bid Contracts for
Indigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1808 (2000) (describing the challenges of
ensuring quality when counties employ low-bid contract systems for indigent
defense).
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to pay, and accumulate low-level criminal charges and criminal
justice debt.
Legislators should remove mandated suspension of driving
privileges for individuals who commit non-highway safety
violations.147 These social non-conformance suspensions waste the
time and resources of police officers, courts, prosecutors, and motor
vehicle agencies and do not serve a public safety purpose. Police
officers’ time spent issuing citations to suspended drivers “takes
valuable time and resources away from other traffic and public
safety efforts.”148 Besides burdening courts and prosecutors with a
surplus of low-level, non-violent offenses, the additional DAS and
DAR cases that result from non-driving related reasons require
motor vehicle agencies to “operate outside of their core mission of
ensuring highway safety.”149
Using license suspensions as a means of forcing criminal
justice debt payment is especially counterproductive. When
Minnesota Representative Zerwas, chief sponsor of a 2017 bill that
sought to expand DDP statewide, was asked by Representative
Hilstrom whether they should consider not suspending licenses for
failure to pay, he responded, “without that penalty, you wouldn’t get
compliance.”150 However, with 75% of suspended drivers continuing
to drive, license suspensions are clearly an ineffective method of
compliance.151 Indeed, the practice defies logic, because “you’re not
going to increase the likelihood that they can pay it by taking away
their driver’s license.”152
As
discussed
in
Part
I.D,
license
suspensions
disproportionately affect poor communities and communities of

147. This possible solution is already gaining interest. Jessie Van Berkel, License
Suspensions a “Catch-22” Some Lawmakers Aim to Fix, STAR TRIB. (Apr. 5, 2018), h
ttp://www.startribune.com/license-suspensions-a-catch-22-some-lawmakers-aim-tofix/478913373/?om_rid=2492076489&om_mid=78329289 (“A measure now under
consideration [by the Minnesota legislature] would prohibit the punishment of
suspending someone’s driver’s license because they did not pay a traffic or parking
ticket.”).
148. AAMVA, supra note 49, at 13.
149. AAMVA, supra note 49, at 22.
150. Pub. Safety & Sec. Policy & Fin. Comm., 2017 Leg., 90th Sess. (Minn. 2017)
(statement by Rep. Zerwas).
151. AAMVA, supra note 49, at 4.
152. Tell Me More: Reconsidering Driver’s License Suspensions as Punishment,
NPR (Mar. 10, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/03/10/288587071/reconsidering-driv
ers-license-suspensions-as-punishment (quoting Mike Riggs).
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color.153 DDP attempts to provide a solution that helps low-income
suspended drivers, but DDP, as an offender-funded program
operated by a private company with little oversight, often ends up
contributing to the burdens facing participants by making them pay
more and entangling them in the criminal justice system for much
longer. Payment plans have the potential to help low-income drivers
pay off fines and fees, but such plans should be made available
before suspension is a threat. If a driver gets a speeding ticket and
needs the time or the opportunity to pay it off in installments, the
court—not a private company—should accommodate that need.
This is possible without charging more through supervision fees,
program fees, and interest, or by threatening suspension, late fees,
or jail, or implementing other government-imposed penalties154 for
failure to make payments. Minnesota should move away from an
offender-funded, revenue-generating criminal justice system.
Legislators should reduce fines and eliminate mandatory
surcharges.155 Additionally, offenders should have options to satisfy
fines online and convert fines to community service.
Conclusion
Minnesota’s Driving Diversion Program attempts to help lowincome suspended drivers get valid licenses, pay off their criminal
justice system debt, and avoid prosecution for driving after
suspension. Several trends in criminal justice contributed to the
creation of DDP including the decriminalization of misdemeanors,
the shift to an offender-funded system, the use of pay-only probation
and diversion outsourced to for-profit companies, and non-driving
related license suspensions.
While not without merit, DDP has not fulfilled the vision of its
creators and supporters. Diversion Solutions, the for-profit
company that administers DDP, has violated the program’s
153. Aiken, supra note 56.
154. Nonpayment of traffic fines would not be immune to any indirect
consequences, such as affecting credit scores. Stacey Tisdale, Real Money Matters:
Unpaid Parking Tickets Can Lead to Lower Credit Score, ALJAZEERA AM. (Oct. 17,
2017), http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/real-money-with-alivelshi/Real-Mo
ney-Blog/2013/10/17/credit-trivia.html.
155. MINN. STAT. § 357.021, subd. 6(a) (2018) (“[T]he court shall impose and the
court administrator shall collect a $75 surcharge on every person convicted of any
felony, gross misdemeanor, misdemeanor, or petty misdemeanor offense, other than
a violation of a law or ordinance relating to vehicle parking, for which there shall be
a $12 surcharge.”).
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enabling legislation by accepting payments prior to a participant’s
proof of insurance, keeping participants enrolled despite
disqualifying moving violations, misrepresenting DDP’s success,
and failing to provide an adequate educational component. These
abuses illustrate that for-profit, pay-only diversion is a flawed
model that puts cost-cutting and profits above quality performance.
The public goal behind DDP—reducing the number of unlicensed
drivers on the road—does not fit with how the third-party, for-profit
company is incentivized, therefore leading to poor quality of service,
unmet promises, and abusive practices.
The Minnesota Legislature should enact accountability
measures that will help reduce DDP’s third-party administrator
abuses such as an effective oversight committee and ideally the
removal of program fees. The Legislature also should consider
addressing the reasons that create and perpetuate the need for
DDP— the burden of criminal justice debt heaped upon unlicensed
drivers who cannot afford to stop driving. Policy changes that meet
this goal include limiting suspensions as a possible sanction for only
bad driving conduct and moving away from an offender-funded
system by reducing fines, making fines easier to pay, and
eliminating mandatory surcharges.

